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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDNA L. KOPP, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation of the State of Utah, 
Def cndant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12999 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt 
Lake County, sustaining and affirming an Order of the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, Anti-Dis-
crimination Division, which Order awarded the Plain-
tiff-Respondent a judgment for back pay based upon a 
finding of discrimination because of sex pursuant to the 
1 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Section 34-35-1, et seq., 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This appeal is 
for the purposes of interpreting the provisions of that 
Act. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Proceedings were had before the Anti-Discrimina-
tion Division of the Industrial Commission of the State 
of Utah, and that body found that discrimination had oc-
curred and awarded Plaintiff-Respondent a judgment 
for back-pay in an amount equaling the difference in 
salary actually paid to the Plaintiff-Respondent and 
that amount paid a police officer at the lowest Civil 
Service grade level, for the period from July l, 1965, 
(the date the Anti-Discrimination Act took effect) un-
til January 15, 1970, (the date the Defendant-Appellant, 
by ordinance, created the new position of "dispatcher.") 
Defendant-Appellant appealed to the Third Judicial 
Court and that Court sustained the finding and upheld 
the Order of the Industrial Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have this court re-
verse the judgment of the lower court and the finding 
and order of the Industrial Commission. 
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STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter referred to as 
Plaintiff, was employed by Defendant-Appellant, here-
inafter referred to as Defendant, on or about December 
7, 1961, as a clerk typist in the Salt Lake City Police 
Department. On or about May 15, 1962, Plaintiff was 
then assigned to the Dispatch Office of said Police De-
partment to act as a radio operator, which was generally 
referred to as a "dispatcher." Plaintiff worked along side 
of male police officers who were also referred to as "dis-
patchers," who handled the incoming phone calls, de-
cided whether or not it was a police matter, evaluated 
the information and made a decision as to what action 
should be taken. The information was then given to the 
female to broadcast to the field officers. At some point 
in time, which point of time was not very well established 
in the record, Plaintiff began, on her own initiative, to 
assume the task, in times of need, of answering the phone 
and helping out the police officers with their job. Grad-
ually, Plaintiff began assuming more of the police offi-
cers' work until at the time of the filing of the complaint 
in this matter, Plaintiff was answering the phone when 
there was an overload of calls coming in to the dispatch 
off ice, when a police officer was not available because of 
sickness, vacation, etc. On the other hand, police officers 
operated the radio only when a female employee was not 
there, such as when she was out for lunch, home ill, vaca-
tions, or such. On or about November 21, 1969, Plaintiff 
filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission charg-
ing discrimination because of sex. 
3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Industrial Commission erred in their finding of 
discrimination as well as its Order awarding back pay to 
the Plaintiff from July 1, 1965, to January 15, 1970, 
and the District Court erred in sustaining that erroneous 
finding and order for the following reasons: 
POINT I 
FOR A CLAIM OF DISCRilHINATION BE-
CAUSE OF SEX TO BE SUSTAINED, THE 
PLAINTIFF MUST, IN FACT, BE EMPLOY-
ED ON THE SAME JOB OR IN THE SAME 
JOB CLASSIFICATION OR POSITION, AND 
IN THIS CASE, THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 
EMPLOYED IN THE SAME JOB, JOB CLAS-
SIFICATION OR POSITION. 
The statute in question, since this is a question of 
first impression, has no legal precedence for guidance in 
the interpretation of that Act. The case before the Court 
at this time is a case of first impression. However, the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 206 ( d) ( 1), is similar 
in nature to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Title 34, 
Chapter 35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Therefore, cases decided under the Equal Pay Act can 
afford some guide line for the interpretation of the Utah 
Act. One difference between these acts, which should be 
noted at the outset is that the Federal Act provides for 
equal pay for equal work, while the Utah Act requires 
that an employee must be employed on the same job, job 
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classification or position to be filled or created; must be 
discriminated against in matters of compensation; and 
that discrimination must be due solely to one of the 
enumerated reasons, one of which is sex, before the re-
quirement of equal pay must be met. The Federal Stat-
ute provides that an employer may not discriminate. 
"Between employees on the basis of sex, by 
paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than 
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of 
the opposite sex ... for equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under 
similar working conditions, except where such 
payment is made pursuant to ... a differential 
based; on an;lj factor other than sea' . ... " 29 U.S.C. 
206 ( d) (I) (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act provides: 
" (I) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair em-
ployment practice: 
(a) For an employer to refuse to hire, to 
discharge, to promote or demot<~, or 
to discriminate in matters of com-
pensation against any person other-
wise qualified, because of . . . sex 
... and no applicant or candidate for 
any job or position shall be deemed 
'otherwise qualified' unless he or she 
possesses the education, training, 
ability, moral character, integrity, 
disposition to work, adherence to 
reasonable rules and regulations, 
and other qualifications required by 
an employer for any particular job, 
}ob classification or position to be 
5 
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filled or created." Sec. 34-35-6, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
(Emphasis added) 
It is definite in the case at bar that the men the 
Plaintiff has worked along side of were not in the same 
job classification with her. She had been classified as a 
"clerk typist" and was subsequently reclassified as a 
"dispatcher," while the men were, with the exception of 
one, police officers and had as their Civil Service desig-
nation either patrolmen, lst, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or Sargeants. 
The one who was not classified as a police officer had a 
classification of "radio operator." Since the job classi-
fications were not the same, the only question left to be 
answered is whether or not the Plaintiff and the men 
performed, in fact, the same "job" or performed within 
the same "position." 
The test which should be applied in order to deter-
mine whether two jobs or two positions are the same or 
not is that the jobs, as a whole, should be viewed over the 
entire work cycle and not by taking isolated incidences 
into consideration. Wirtz v. Rainbo Baking Co., 303 F. 
Supp. 1049 (1967); Wirtz v .Basic, Inc., 250 F.Supp. 
786 ( 1966). It is the substantiality test which is applied 
in the cases decided under the Federal Act, i.e., whether 
differences in the job are merely incidental, insignificant 
and inconsequential, or whether they are so substantial 
as to justify a cliff erent classification, therefore, con-
sidered as different jobs. This means that persons per-
forming some functions which are the same, but where 
other functions are different, this does not constitute the 
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same job unless those additional functions are incidental, 
insignificant and inconsequential. The court in Shultz v. 
Brookhaven General Hospital, 305 F.Supp. 424 (1969), 
at page 426, stated the proposition thusly: 
"In determining a violation of the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963, the requirements of the particular 
job should be compared rather than the skill of 
individual employees, or their previous training 
and experience. 
"'Equal' as used in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
does not mean identical and insubstantial differ-
ences in the skill, effort and responsibility re-
quirements of particular jobs should be ignored. 
The job requirements are to be viewed as a 
whole." (Emphasis added) 
In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 
( 1970), the court, at page 265, said: 
"Congress in prescribing 'equal' work did not 
require that the jobs be identical but only that 
they must be substantially equal." 
The Utah Legislature did not see fit to enact this 
same provision, that is, equal pay for equal work, which 
the courts interpret as requiring "substantially equal" 
jobs. Under the Utah Act an employee must be em-
ployed on the same "job, job classification or position to 
be filled or created." Thus, under the Utah law it would 
appear there is not the leeway that is given under the 
Federal Act for an employee to be in a different job and 
still be entitled to receive the pay of another job because 
it is "substanttially equal." This would mean that where 
there are two different jobs, even though some functions 
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are performed which are the same, the Utah Act would 
not require that both jobs be paid the same amount. 
Thus, under the Utah Act it is urged that the jobs must 
be identical in nature before a discrimination charge will 
be sustained. 
The Wheaton Glass Co. case was appealed from the 
lower court and on appeal the decision of the lower court 
was reversed. In the lower court, the cases was entitled, 
Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 284 F.Supp. 23 ( 1968). In 
that case, the lower court said that there might be eco-
nomic reasons for having men and women performing 
the same functions at times and still allow a higher wage 
paid to the men because of added responsibility. The 
court acknowledged that these economic reasons would 
allow a finding that any discrimination which had oc-
curred would not then be because of sex. In that case, 
men and women were performing the identical task 82% 
of the time on a job which was classified as "selector-
packers." The job of selector-packers was to inspect the 
bottles for any defects as they emerged on a conveyor 
from the oven. The defective products were discarded 
while those that met the standards were packaged. The 
Company had another category of employees known as 
"snap-up boys," who crated and moved the bottles and 
generally functioned as handymen, sweeping, cleaning 
and performing other unskilled miscellaneous tasks. The 
male selector-packers spent about 18% of their time 
performing sixteen additional tasks, which tasks were 
performed by the snap-up boys on a full time basis. The 
lower court held that spending 18% of their time doing 
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other tasks was significant enough to require that the 
finding of the job of the male selector-packers was not 
even substantially equal with the job the female selector-
packers performed. In that case the lower court stated: 
"The basic issue, of course, requires the deter-
mination of whether there is a difference, in fact, 
between male and female performance in the job 
of selector-packers and if so, whether such differ-
ence is essential and substantial enough to con-
stitute a realistic ecorwmic basis for disparity and 
wage rates. However, if such difference is merely 
incidental, insignificant and unsubstantial to the 
performance of the principal task of the depart-
ment in question, then it must be concluded that it 
is more artificial than real, leaving sex as the only 
realistic and distinctive basis for the wage dis-
partiy, contrary to the Act." Wirtz v. Wheaton 
Glass Co., supra, at page 31. (Emphasis added) 
In stating that the additional functions performed by the 
men constituted a separate job, and, therefore, allowed a 
disparity in pay, the court observed: 
"As heretofore stated, the declared purpose of 
the Act was to eliminate discrimination in wage 
payments to employees on the basis of sex where 
equal work was being performed by both men 
and women under the same or similar working 
conditions. However, if the differential is based 
upon any other factor other than sex, then that 
differential is beyond the reach of the Act." 
Wirtz v. Wheaton Glass Co., supra, at page 31. 
As in the Federal Act, the Utah Act should like-
wise be interpreted to mean that if the disparity in the 
9 
rate of pay is based upon any other factor other than sex, 
such disparity is "beyond the reach of the Act." 
There must be allowed a discretion to the em-
ployer to evaluate the employee's work and to set wages 
accordingly. 
"For as was said by Congressman Goodell, in 
speaking of the intent of the Act, '(W) e want 
the private enterprise system, employer and em-
ployee and a union, if there is a union, to have a 
maximum degree of discretion in working out the 
evaluation of the employee's work and how much 
he should be paid for it ... [sex] is the sole factor 
that we are insisting as a restriction.' " Wirtz v. 
Wheaton Glass Co., supra, at page 32. 
"The Act was never intended to circumscribe 
an employer's appraisal or determination of the 
need and utilitarian value of an employee's per-
formance. What was intended was prohibition of 
specious distinction based upon sex alone, all 
other things being equal." Wirtz v. Wheaton 
Glass Co., supra, at page 33. 
Hence, in order to have a claim for discrimination, all 
other factors, other than sex, must be the same. Under 
the Utah Act this requires that male and female must be 
on the same job, job classification or position to be filled 
or created. 
"True, in the assembly line phase of selecting 
and packing both men and women performed 
identical functions. If nothing more remained to 
be done, and in fact was not done, then it would 
seem clear that within the confines of this work 
function, they would be performing equal work 
for which equal pay should be mandated. But the 
10 
evidence demonstrates that such is not the case. 
:For the job of the male neither begins nor ends 
with the particular performance, as it does with 
the female. It is the extended scope of the male's 
job requirements, coupled with other distinguish-
ing factors, heretofore set forth, and their cumu-
lative effect upon which focus must be directed. 
So viewed, the proof amply demonstrates that 
men and women do not perform equal work under 
similar conditions within the intent of the Act. To 
the contrary, men are required to exert additional 
effort, to possess additional skill and to have ad-
ditional responsibility, which frequently are per-
formed and discharged under the ever changing 
demands of working conditions, dissimilar to 
those prevailing for women." Wirtz v. Wheaton 
Glass Co., supra, at page 34. 
This case, as mentioned, was reversed by the Appellate 
Court, but not because of auy error the lower court made 
by its decision that the additional functions performed 
by the men, constituting only about 18% of their time, 
made the jobs different. One reason the decision was 
overturned was because: 
"While all male selector-packers received the 
higher rate of pay, there is no finding that all of 
them are either available for or actually perform 
'snap-up boys' work." Sh11Hz v. Wheaton G'-ass 
Co., supra, at page 264. 
The second reason was that the snap-up boys were paid 
only two cents ( 2c) an hour more than the female selec-
tor-packers, while the male selector-packers were paid 
211/2 cents more than the women. 
11 
"On its face the record presents the incongruity 
t~at because male selector-packers spent a rela-
tively small portion of their time doing the work 
of snap-up boys whose houriy rate of pay is $2.16, 
they are paid $2.355 per hour for their own work 
while female selector-packers receive only $2.14: 
This immediately casts doubt on any contention 
that the difference in the work done by male and 
female selector-packers, which amounts substan-
tially to what the snap-up boys do, is of itself 
enough to explain the difference in the rate of 
pay for male and female selector-packers on 
grounds other than sex." Shultz v. Wheaton 
Glass Co., supra, at page 262. 
In Shultz v. Victoria Nat'l Bank, 240 F.2d 648 
( 1910), the facts were that women were performing the 
exact same job as the men but being paid less. The de-
fendant claimed that the men were on a training pro-
gram which the court said was in practice, sporadic, un-
specific, unpredictable, and unplanned and, therefore, 
did not comply with the exemption. The Victoria Na-
tional Bank case stands for the proposition that, under 
the Federal Act, the defendant has the burden of proof 
as to whether one of the exemptions given under that 
Act is applied to his case. The Federal Equal Pay Act 
provides for several exemptions which allow a disparity 
in wages if the payments are made pursuant to ( 1) a 
seniority system, ( 2) a merit system, ( 3) a system which 
measures earnings by quality or quantity, or ( 4) a dif-
ference based on any other factor other than sex. The 
Utah Act does not provide for these exemptions. There-
fore, the entire burden is upon the Plaintiff to establish 
that she is employed on the same job, or is classified in 
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the same job classification or position; that she has been 
discriminated against; and that discrimination has, as its 
sole basis, the reason of her being of a different sex/. The 
Industrial Commission e~red in applying the standards 
of the Federal Act requiring Defendant to establish that 
one of these exceptions of the Federal Act applied to 
this case. Even if it were true that in the case at bar the 
defendant must prove that it comes within one of the 
exceptions, this we have done, The disparity at hand is 
simply and purely for reasons other than sex. The first 
is, as previously discussed, because the two jobs in the 
dispatch office are not the same "job, job classification, 
or position to be filled or created." See Defendant's 
Memorandum filed before the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, designated in the record of the Industrial Com-
mission as Item 284; the same is hereby made a part of 
this Brief and incorporated herein by reference. Sec-
ondly, the difference in pay is because of additional 
qualifications which the men possess so far as "educa-
tion, training and ability," provided by their basic train-
ing, inservice training and their actual experience out in 
the field. It is for these reasons and these reasons alone, 
that the men are being paid at a higher rate of pay. When 
women perform the same job for Salt Lake City as do 
men, they are paid the same wages, e.g., Salt Lake City 
has two police women and they are paid on the same pay 
scale as police men. 
Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 265 F.Supp. 787 
( 1967), is also an interesting case regarding what con-
stitutes a separate job or an unequal job under the Fed-
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eral Equal Pay Act. Again, in that case the men and the 
women worked on the same machines doing exactly the 
same job, but the men had the additional job of changing 
over their machines when starting work on a new order 
and also making repairs and adjustments on their ma-
chines when necessary, as well as getting their own ma-
terial to work on and moving their finished work to the 
shipping areas. Despite the fact that these additional 
functions required only about 10% of the male opera-
tor's time, the court held that these two jobs were not 
substantially equal. In discussing what the real issue in 
this case was, the court said: 
"The real issue is whether these differences are, 
as plaintiff contends, merely incidental, insigni-
ficant and inconsequential, or whether, as de-
fendant argues, they are so substantial as to justi-
fy the pay differential which existed." Wirtz v. 
Dennison Mfg. Co., supra, at page 789. 
The court held these additional tasks to be different 
and substantial ones; thus, justifying the finding that 
these jobs were unequal. 
"The court finds that the difference was a sub-
stantial one. The men on the third shift had to 
possess skills not required by the women opera-
tors. Of course, they were not required to be ex-
perienced machinists, but they did have to possess 
a significant degree of mechanical skill and abil-
ity in order to change o_ver their machines from 
job to job and to repair them when necessary. 
They also had to perform the task of m.oving their 
own materials to and from their machmes, a task 
which required physical effort which the women 
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operators who testified said they could not or 
would not perform. These activities, while they 
may not have taken up more than 10% of the 
men's working time, were an essential part of 
their task which they had to perform on every 
working night and without which the job could 
not have been performed. They were clearly far 
more than incidental or occasional extra work." 
Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., supra ,at page 789. 
Here, where the men performed the same job as the wo-
men performed ninety percent of the time, but had addi-
tional tasks which took only ten percent of their time, the 
court said there was nothing to show that sex discrimina-
tion was involved in this instance. 
"In the situation here invo]ved, there is nothing to 
show that sex discrimination played any part in 
determining the pay rate on the third shift (on 
which shift only men operated the machines). De-
fendant's action was clearly justified by other 
adequate motives of an economic nature." Wirtz 
v. Dennison Mfg. Co., supra, at page 790. 
In the case at bar, we have the exact opposite 
situation as was found in the Federal cases heretofore 
referred to. Rather than the women performing the 
identical job with the males a great majority of the 
time the Plaintiff in this case performed as a basic func-
tion a separate job from the males and only a small por-
tion of the time was spent doing the same job as the 
males. In the dispatch office at the Police Department 
there are two separate jobs with the basic functions of the 
women being the task of operating the radio, while the 
basic function of the men is that of handling the incom-
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ing calls, evaluating them, making decisions and direct-
ing what action is to be taken in response to these calls. 
There is some overlapping of responsibilities in that the 
women perform the same functions as do the men; how-
ever, they do not perform these same functions to exactly 
the same extent as do the men, nor do they perform 
these functions anywhere near the length of time the 
men do. The women perform these same functions only 
when there is no man available because of illness, holi-
days or vacations; or when there is an overload of incom-
ing calls. 
Merely because a person replaces another for periods 
of time or merely assists performing functions for that 
other person does not mean that he or she is entitled to 
the pay of that job. In Wirtz v. Rainha Baking Co., 
303 F.Supp. 1049 (1967) , 1the court said that a person 
working only a part of the time on a different job does 
not entitle that person to the pay of that job for the 
entire period. The court said that: 
"The fact that one of the men replaces the 
truck-loader one day a week is not a justification 
for paying him the entire week at a wage rate 
higher than that paid to women." Wirtz v. Rainbo 
Baking Co., 303 F.Supp. 1049. (1967), at page 
1052. 
The second basis for discrimination in the case at 
hand is the training, ability, and experience of the men 
as opposed to that of the Plaintiff. The Statute con-
templates that persons possessing greater "education, 
training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition 
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to work, adherence to reasonable rules and regulations 
and other qualifications required by an employer," may 
be classified at a higher rate of pay. It is because of 
this additional training and ability that the men working 
in the dispatch off ice had the basic responsibility of 
handling the incoming calls and making decisions as 
to how to respond to them, and it is because of this addi-
tional training and ability that they were paid more 
and not because of any discrimination having as its 
basis sex. Persons having greater training and ability 
working within the dispatch office are by virtue of that 
additional training and ability of greater value to the 
Defendant. It would be economically unfeasible for 
the Defendant to have had an additional man on duty 
to handle peak load periods or in the event of illness or 
vacations; hence, it was for this reason that the women 
were allowed to help out during these periods of time. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF IN THE INSTANT CASE 
WAS NOT "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" BE-
CAUSE SHE DOES NOT POSSESS THE EDU-
CATION, TRAINING, ABILITY AND OTHER 
QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY HER EM-
PLOYER FOR THE POSITION OF POLICE 
OFFICER. 
The Statute is clear that a person must possess the 
education, training, ability and any other qualifications 
required by the employer in order to be "otherwise 
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qualified" for any job, job classification or position to 
be filled or created. The pay which the Plaintiff is 
seeking is that of a police officer and in most instances 
she is seeking the salary of a patrolman first class. In 
order to gain that classification it is required that police 
officers pass a test to become patrolman fourth grade 
as well as having special training and education and 
specialized courses, such as, hand-to-hand combat, train-
ing in the use of various weapons, riot-control training, 
first aid and many more. A patrolman must also pass a 
test for each promotion, i.e., a test for advancement 
to patrolman third grade, one for advancement to 
second grade, and one for advancement to first grade. 
Further, in-service training is required each year. The 
Plaintiff had one day of formal class training while on 
her job for eight and one-half ( 81/z) years and has 
never taken a test for any advancement; therefore, she 
does not possess the education, training, ability and 
other qualifications required by her employer, hence, 
is not "otherwise qualified" as defined by the Statute 
for the job of patrolman. 
The court in Detective Endowment Ass'n Police 
Dept. v. Leary, 320 N.Y.S. 2d 253 ( 1971), held that the 
police commissioner had the right to assign patrolmen 
to perform duties of detectives for an extended period 
of time without receiving the higher pay of detectives. 
The court said that, 
"The assignment of a patrolman to the Detec-
tive Division does not involve the transfer to a po-
sition requiring an examination or involving tests 
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or qualifi~ations different from or higher than 
those reqmred for the position of patrolman. The 
assignment of patrolman to any bureau of the 
Police Department does not change the patrol-
man's Civil Service status." 
Further, the court said that, "[T]he designation of the 
patrolman as detective is wholly within the discretion 
of the police commissioner and may be revoked at his 
pleasure." 
As in that case, the transfer of the Plaintiff to the 
dispatch office in the instant case was not one requiring 
a test or qualifications different from or higher than 
the lower classification of clerk typist, so in the instant 
case, the Chief of Police had the right to transfer clerks 
into the dispatch off ice "by assignment only" without 
the requirement of testing and promotion. 
The Civil Service Commission established the classi-
fication of employees and this classification requires, 
upon hiring or promotion a different set of prerequisites, 
i.e., physical and mental testing, police training, both 
basic and in-service training, and different duties for 
each classification. No attack on the classification was 
made by the Plaintiff in the instant case. Unless the 
Civil Service Commission acted arbitrarily in its classi-
fication, a court should not interfere therewith. The 
question then comes down to, "Did the Plaintiff meet 
the requirements of the classification she is seeking the 
pay for?" If not, she is not entitled to the pay of that 
classification. 
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Merely because some duties may be performed 
by persons who are within two different pay classifica-
tions does not mean that they are entitled to the same 
pay. 
In Eley v. Cahill, 126 Ill.App. 2d 27~, 261 N.E. 819 
( 1970), the employees in the Animal Care Unit of the 
Police Department of Chicago filed a petition for a man-
damus to compel the defendant to elevate them to the 
same pay scale as patrolmen and requested back salary. 
On January 1, 1959, the particular employees were re-
classified from a higher grade with a pay equal to that 
of the patrolmen to civilian employees at a lower pay 
scale than patrolmen. These employees were required 
to take the oath, uphold and enforce the laws the 
same as were the patrolmen; purchase and wear uni-
forms similar if not identical to the uniforms worn by 
the patrolmen; purchase revolvers and ammunition; 
enforce the laws and the city ordinances as well as 
exercise powers of arrest the same as the patrolmen; 
respond to calls on the police radio and operate police 
department equipment and in all other ways perform 
the functions and duties of a patrolman assigned to a 
special detail. It was further alleged that regularly 
classified patrolmen were and had been assigned to the 
Animal Care Center and were assigned the same func-
tions and duties as were the plaintiffs with a difference 
in pay. 
The court held that without actually performing 
the identical overall functions of patrolmen they could 
not claim the same pay. 
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"It is not sufficient that some duties of these 
employees coincide with duties of patrolmen if 
suc.h duties are only incidental or auxiliary duties 
which these employees are required to perform." 
Eley v. Cahill, suvra, at page 821. 
This was so even though police officers, as part of their 
assignment, were assigned to perform the same tasks 
and functions as the Animal Care Unit. 
"Neither are plaintiffs allegations that regular 
patrolmen are occasionally assigned to the Ani-
mal Care Unit duties persuasive. The determina-
tive question is not whether regularly classified 
patrolmen are assigned to Animal Care Unit 
functions but, rather, whether the plaintiffs are, 
in fact, assigned to the regular performance of 
patrolmen functions." Eley v. Cahill, supra at 
page 822. 
POINT III 
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT CON-
TEMPLATES ONLY A PROSPECTIVE AP-
PLICATION OF THE ACT AND DOES NOT 
APPLY TO JOBS WHICH WERE, AT THE 
TIME OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE ACT, 
ALREADY CREATED AND FILLED; 
THEREFORE, THE ACT DOES NOT APPLY 
TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THAT THE POSI-
TION SHE OCCUPIED WAS CREATED AND 
'VAS FILLED BY HER AT THE TIME OF 
THE ENACTMENT OF THE ACT. 
Section 34-35-6 (a) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, states that it is a discriminatory or unfair 
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employment practice to do certain prohibited acts be-
cause of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry or national 
origin if the person is "otherwise qualified." The Act 
then defines "otherwise qualified" and states that a 
person is not "otherwise qualified unless he or she 
possesses the education, training, ability, moral char-
acter, integrity, disposition to work, adherence to rea-
sonable rules and regulations, and other qualifications 
required by an employer for any particular job, job 
classification or position to be filled or created." (Em· 
phasis added). The words "to be filled or created" are 
in the future tense and for that reason it was the clear 
intent of the Legislature that this section was to apply 
only to jobs, job classifications or positions which were 
to be filled or created after the Act was enacted. 
The rule of statutory construction is that whenever 
reasonably possible effect should be given to every 
word, phrase, clause and sentence of a statute. Chez 
v. Utah St. Bldg. Comm., 93 Ut. 538, 74 P.2d 687 
(1937). A statute should be construed so that effect is 
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be in-
operative or superfluous, void or insignificant. "The 
court should, where possible without adding to or taking 
from the language, find the meaning compatible with 
reason and sense." Chez v. Utah St. Bldg. Comm., supra, 
citing, Robinson v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 70 Ut. 441, 
261 P. 9. This is especially true where the meaning 
of the words is plain. See Home Building and Loan 
Association v. City of Spartanburg, 185 S.C. 313, 194 
S.E. 139 (1938); or if a meaning can be reached without 
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the elimination of any words. State v. Lundquist, 60 
Wash. 2d 397, 37 4 P.2d 246 ( 1962). The words "to 
be filled or created" have a clear and understood mean-
ing and that meaning must be applied to them. 
The job, job classification or position in which 
Plaintiff was employed was created and was filled by 
her prior to the enactment of said act; therefore, the 
Act has no application to her. 
POINT IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION EXCEED-
ED ITS AUTHORITY AND COMMITTED A 
BREACH OF DISCRETION BY AWARDING 
BACK-PAY IN THAT THIS IS NOT A CASE 
IN WHICH BACK-PAY SHOULD BE A CON-
SIDERATION. 
The Anti-Discrimination Act provides in Section 
34-35-7 (12), Utah Code Anrwtated, 1953, as amended: 
"If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the 
Commission shall find that a respondent has en-
gaged in or is engaging in, any discriminatory or 
unfair employment practice as defined in this 
chapter, the Commission shall state its findings 
of fact and shall issue and cause to be served 
upon such respondent an order requiring such re-
spondent to cease and desist from such discrim-
inatory or unfair employment practice and to 
take such affirmative action, including, but not 
limited to, hiring, reinstatement, or up-grading o.f 
employees, with or without back-pay ... as in the 
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judgment of the Commission will effectuate the 
purposes of this chapter." (Emphasis added) 
The Commission has a right then to up-grade employees 
without giving back-pay as well as the granting of 
back-pay depending upon the fact situation. In the case 
of a municipality the governing body must establish 
a budget for each year and cannot vary that budget 
without reopening thereof. This matter of budgeting, 
setting of salaries, assignment of pay classifications, 
and assignment of personnel is a municipal function 
and purely a local matter to be established by the local 
government officials who are responsible to the citizens. 
The Utah Constitution prohibits the delegation of 
any municipal function by the Legislature. Article VI, 
Section 29, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
"The Legislature shall not delegate to any spe-
cial commission ... any power to make, supervise 
or interfere with any municipal improvements, 
money, property or effects ... or to perform any 
municipal function." 
By granting back-pay, the Industrial Commission 
is supervising or interfering with municipal money and 
is performing a municipal function. This they cannot 
do. This court stated in Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Ut. 
2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967) at page 453: 
"The responsibility for the operation of the city 
government rests with the City Commission, who 
are elected by and responsible to the public." 
Arbitrary power or uncontrolled discretion in an ad-
ministrative agency is generally precluded. 
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"It is a fundamental principle or our system of 
government that the rights of men are to be deter-
mined by the law itself, and not by the let or leave 
of administrative agencies, and this principle 
ought not to be surrendered for convenience, or in 
effect nullified for the sake of expediency." 
1 Am.Jur. 2d, Section 108. 
A statute which in effect reposes an absolute, unregu-
lated, and undefined discretion in an administrative 
agency bestows arbitrary powers and is an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power. A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 79 L.ed. 
1570, 55 S.Ct. 839 ( 1935) ; Eureka City v. Wil,son, 
15 Ut. 67, 48 P. 150 ( 1897). The Legislature cannot 
vest in an administrative agency the power, in its 
absolute or unguided discretion, to apply or withhold 
the application of the law, or to say to whom a law 
shall or shall not be applied. Walsh v. Dallas R. & 
Terminal Co., 140 Tex. 385, 167 S.W.2d 1018. 
The legislative authority must set up fixed legal 
principles which are to control in given cases by setting 
up standards or guide lines to indicate the extent and 
prescribe the limits of the discretion which may be exer-
cised under the statutes by the administrative agency. 
United States v. Chicago, M.St. P. & P.R. Co., 282 
U.S. 311, 75 L.ed. 359; Morgan v. United States, 304 
U.S. 1, 82 L.ed. 1129. In fact ,the generally accepted 
rule is that a statute which vests an arbitrary discretion 
in an administrative agency with reference to the rights 
or property of individuals or an ordinarily lawful busi-
ness or occupation without prescribing a uniform rule 
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of action, making the enjoyment of such rights depend 
upon arbitrary choice of the agency without reference 
to all persons of the class to which the statute is intended 
to be applicable and without furnishing any definite 
standards or control of the agency, is unconstitutional 
and void. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organi-
zation, 307 U.S. 496, 83 L.ed. 1423; Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 30 L.ed. 220. The standards in 
conferring discretionary power upon an administra-
tive agency must be reasonably adequate, sufficient, 
and definite for the guidance of the agency in the 
exercise of power conferred upon it. State v. Marana 
Plantations, Inc., 75 Ariz. 111, 252 P.2d 87; Jersey 
Maid Mills Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 91 
P.2d 577, and must also be sufficient to enable those 
affected to know their rights and obligations. United 
States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 
83 L.ed. 1446. In the statute here in question there 
were absolutely no guide lines or standards set to govern 
with regards to whether or whether not back-pay should 
be awarded. The awarding or withholding of back-pay 
was left completely to the discretion of the Commission. 
The Commission is further not authorized to grant 
solely back-pay as an award for discrimination. The 
Statute contemplates that back-pay may be awarded 
only in conjunction with other affirmative action, such 
as, "hiring, reinstatement, or up-grading of employees." 
The up-grading of employees or other affirmative 
action must be taken by the Commission upon which 
to base the award of back-pay. In the instant case there 
26 
was no affirmative action taken by the Commission 
other than an award for back-pay. The Act contem-
plates the elimination of discrimination and not the 
awarding of damages as a matter of right. The Com-
mission did not up-grade the Plaintiff to the position 
of Police Officer as a Patrolman 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th 
grade and did not place her within any other Civil 
Service classification, but merely awarded her back-pay. 
This is also not a case for an award of back-pay 
since the basic reason for the disparity was not due to 
the underpayment of Plaintiff, but assignment of 
overqualified police officers within the dispatch office. 
The identical question was raised in Mize v. State Divi-
sion of Human Rights, 328 N.Y.S. 2d 983 (Jan., 1972). 
In that case a woman acting as matron in the New 
York City jail was performing exactly the same func-
tions as police officers who were acting in the capacity 
of "turnkey" (jailers). The Plaintiff in that case per-
formed the same tasks with regard to the female 
prisoners as did the police officers with regard to the 
male prisoners. The court said, after finding that it was 
the same job and that discrimination had occurred, in 
regards to the question of back-pay, at page 988: 
"The final question is whether the matrons 
should be awarded back-pay to August 5, 1968. 
The Executive Law provides that the order of 
the Commission may provide for the up-grading 
of employees, with or without back-pay .... How-
ever, no standard is set forth for determining 
when back-pay should be awarded. We do not be-
lieve that back-pay should be awarded in this in-
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stance, since the basic reason for the disparity in 
pay was not the under-payment of the matrons 
for the work performed but, rather, the assign-
ment of overqualified personnel to the position of 
turnkey. We find that the award of back-pay by 
the Commission was an abuse of discretion." 
POINTV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE 
INTERROGATORIES OF PLAINTIFF TO 
BE ANSWERED REGARDING SALARIES 
OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE DIS-
PATCH OFFICE AND IN BASING THE 
AWARD FOR BACK-PAY UPON THOSE IN-
TERROGATORIES. 
The Industrial Commission ordered the Defendant 
to pay to the Plaintiff, "an amount equaling the differ-
ence in salary actually paid her and that paid to a 
police officer at the lowest Civil Service grade level, 
for the period from July 1, 1965, to January 15, 1970. 
Exact amount payable to be determined from Salt Lake 
City Corporation payroll records." The District Court 
sustained the findings of the Industrial Commission 
and upheld its Order, the court used the interrogatories 
and erroneously applied the salary of the lowest paid 
police officer in the dispatch office. By so doing, the 
court arrived at a ridiculous result in that the back-pay 
awarded to the Plaintiff fluctuates depending upon 
the classification of the police officer working in the dis-
patch office at that particular period of time. The salary 
of the police officer is based upon longevity as well as 
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their training and successful passing of tests required 
for each position. By this erroneous order, the Plaintiff's 
salary fluctuated according to the longevity and pro-
motions of the police officers within the dispatch office, 
rather than according to her own longevity. For this 
reason, it is respectfully submitted that any award, 
if such is granted, should be based upon the salary of 
a police officer at the lowest Civil Service grade level, 
which is a patrolman fourth grade. These figures are 
obtainable from the payroll records of defendant. 
POINT VI 
AN AWARD FOR BACK-PAY MAY NOT BE 
AWARDED BEYOND THE THREE YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ANY IN-
STALLMENT BEYOND THAT PERIOD IS 
BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953. 
In an action alleging discrimination under Section 
34-35-7, subparagraph (12), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, there must be applied a period of 
limitation limiting the period for which back pay may 
be awarded. The applicable Utah Statutes are Sections 
78-12-1 and 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
These sections, or the applicable portions thereof, are 
as follows: 
"Civil actions can be commenced only within 
the period prescribed in this chapter, after the 
cause of action shall have accrued, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed 
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by statute. Section 78-12-1, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
"Within three years: 
"(I)*** 
"(2) *** 
"(3) * * * 
" ( 4) An action for a liability created by the 
statutes of this state other than for a penalty or 
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except 
where in special cases a different limitation is 
prescribed by the statutes of this state." Sec-
tion 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The above statutes of the Utah Code are applicable 
sections which must be applied to a claim for back 
wages under an action alleging sex discrimination. 
There can be no doubt that the purported liability is one 
arising under a statute of Utah. The complaint itself 
charges that the Plaintiff was discriminated against in 
matters of compensation because of sex in violation of 
Section 34-35-6, subparagraph ( 1), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, and that she should be com-
pensated for back pay pursuant to Section 34-35-7, 
subparagraph (12), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Statutes of limitation are founded upon the general 
experience of mankind that claims which are valid 
should not be allowed to remain neglected once a person 
has a right to sue thereon. Weber v. State Harbor 
Comrs., 18 Wall. (U.S.) 57, 21 L.ed. 798 (1873); 
Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 532, 18 L.ed. 939 
( 1868) . In order to encourage promptness in bringing 
an action, such statutes are enacted to restrict to a fixed 
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period of time the claims which might otherwise be 
asserted for an unlimited term. Riddles Barger v. Hart-
ford F. Ins. Co., 7 Wall. (U.S.) 386, 19 L.ed. 257 
(1869) .The very purpose and object of statutes of limi-
tation is to compel the exercise of a right to action 
within a reasonable time. Lamb v. Powder River Live-
stock Co., 132 F. 434, 67 L.R.A. 558 ( 1904), and to 
bring to rest any claim based upon that right. Ashton 
Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Ut. 587, 192 P. 375, 11 
A. L. R. 7 52 ( 1920) . If a claim is not asserted within 
the prescribed period, then the statute of limitation is 
a bar to any recovery based upon that claim. 
A principle which is generally resorted to in the 
interpretation of statutes of limitation is that a court 
may consider reasonableness of the result of a par-
ticular construction and the practical effect of the 
adoption of a different interpretation. Jennings v. 
Lowery and Berry, 147 Miss. 673, 112 So. 692 (1927); 
Adams and Freese Co. v. Kenoyer, 17 N.D. 302, 116 
N. W. 98 ( 1908) . A ridiculous result could be reached 
in the case of back pay if no statute of limitation were 
applied. An employee could work on a job for 20 or 
30 years without any complaint or without any request 
for additional pay and then bankrupt an employer with 
a claim for back wages for all of those years based upon 
a claim of discrimination. 
That the case at bar is an action for a liability created 
by the statutes of this state cannot be disputed. A 
liability created by a statute is a liability which would 
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not exist but for the statute. Houg v. Haug, 206 Oki. 
179, 242 P.2d 162 (1952); Smith Eng. Works v. Custer, 
194 Oki. 318, 151 P. 2d 404 (1944). 
It has been held that the statutory claims limitation 
period limiting an action created by a statute applies 
to claims for back wages where the claim was for over-
time compensation under the 1'-.air Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C.A., Sections 201-219, Abram v. Sam 
Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., (D.C. Cal.) 46 F. Supp. 969 
(1942); Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., (D.C. Cal.), 
45 F. Supp. 128 (1942). The same limitation period 
also applies to the liability of an employer for injuries 
sustained by an employee, under the New York State 
Labor Law, Smith v. Onondaga Pottery Co., 300 
N.Y.S. 298, 164 Miss. 883 (1937). It has likewise been 
applied to actions brought under the Utah State Work-
man's Compensation Law, Utah Const. Min. Co. v. 
Industrial Comm., 57 Ut. 279, 194 P. 657 (1920). In 
Romer v. Leary, 428 F. 2d 186 ( 1970), the Second 
Circuit Court of. Appeals for the Southern District of 
New York held that where a policeman was discharged 
in 1963 for refusing to waive immunity from prosecu-
tion when he was called to testify before the Grand 
Jury, and where the action was not commenced until 
1968, such claim is governed by the three year statute 
of limitation provided for suits "to recover upon a lia-
bility created or imposed by statute." In that case, the 
court, at Page 187, stated: 
"It is now settled by Swan v, Board of Higher 
Education (2nd Cir. 1963) 319 F. 2d 56, that a 
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suit seeking a declaratory for injunctive relief 
which is based on the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
1983, the applicable limitation in a case arising in 
New York, is the three year limitation now pro-
vided for suits to 'recover upon the liability ... 
created or imposed by statute' ... that the present 
case seeking reinstatement and back pay, is cast 
in declaratory judgment form does not attract to 
it the six year statute that the state court would 
apply to an action commenced under the state 
declaratory judgment law. Cplr., Section 3001." 
The next question which arises is when does the 
period of limitation in the present case begin to run? 
The prescribed statute of limitation period runs from 
the time the action accrues, i.e., when the plaintiff has 
a right of action and when there is a remedy available. 
West v. Theis, 15 Id. 167, 96 P. 932 (1908); Bruner 
v. Martin, 76 Kan. 862, 93 P. 165 (1907); Jrmne v. 
Bossen, 25 Cal. 2d 652,156 P.2d 9 (1944). The rule 
is that the right of action accrues whenever a wrong 
has been sustained as will give a right to bring and 
sustain a suit. Aachen & N.F. Ins. Co. v. Morton, 
(C.C.A 6th) 156 F. 654, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 156 ( 1907). 
An installment of periodic payment is a continual one, 
and any limitation on the right to sue for each install-
ment necessarily commences to run from the time that 
each installment actually falls due. Abbott v. City of 
Los Angeles, 50 Cal.2d 438, 326 P.2d 484 (1958); 
Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Ut. 391, 231 P. 
123 (1924). 
This principle has been applied against rental 
installments and held the right of action accrues on each 
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installment when that installment becomes due and any 
past due installments beyond the period prescribed by 
the statute of limitation are barred. Tillson v. Peters, 
41 Cal.App.2d 671 ( 1941), 107 P.2d 434. Likewise, 
when payments are due in installments for payment 
under a judgment for child support, any installments 
beyond the statute of limitation are barred. Leonard 
v. Kleitz, 155 Kan. 626, 127 P .2d 421 ( 1942). When 
a note is payable in installments, the statute begins to 
run against each installment when that installment be-
comes due and payable. Buckman v. Hill Military 
Academy, 182 Ore. 621, 189 P.2d 575. When the 
question arose as to what period of limitation should 
be applied to additional back-pay under a pension pay-
ment program, the court in Abbott v. City of Los 
Angeles, supra, at page 498, stated: 
"As indicated in Martin v. Hendrickson, 40 
Cal.2d 583, 593, 225 P.2d 416 ( 1953), the rule is, 
however that the availability for an action for de-
claratory relief in no way affects the period of 
limitations commencing upon the breach of an 
obligation to pay money. Neither is the right to 
declaratory relief with respect to the obligation 
to make payments which fall within the limita-
tions barred .... Here, as we have seen, the statu-
tory time limitation upon the right to sue for each 
pension and installment commences to run from 
the time when that installment falls due. It fol-
lows that even though plaintiffs might have 
earlier brought suit for declaratory relief .. ., their 
failure to do so does not operate to bar this right 
to declaratory relief with respect to future pen-
sion payments, as well as the monetary judgment 
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for the difference, for three years .... In Dillon 
v. Board of Pension Com'rs., 18 Cal.2d 427, 431-
432, 116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 800 (1941); ... 
this court declared .... 'If the pension is granted, 
he is entitled to receive payments in the future, 
but can recover only those past payments which 
would have accrued within a period of six months 
prior to the time of the making of the claim.' " 
In Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., supra, at page 
124, the court said: 
"The authorities seem to be overwhelmingly in 
favor of the claim made by respondent that, 
'When a judgment is rendered payable in install-
ments, the statute of limitations begins to run 
against it from the time fixed for the payment of 
each installment for the part then payable.' 23 
Cyc. 1510. Respondent has cited the following 
authorities supporting the general rule of law 
contained in the above quotation.'' 
The court then cited several cases. 
Since wages are a periodic payment falling due 
upon each payday, wages beyond the period of limi-
tation are barred by the statute of limitation. Fry v. 
Board of Education, 17 Cal.2d 753, 112 P.2d 229 
(1941). Roseborough v. Shasta River Canal Co., 22 
Cal.App. 556; Raymond v. Christian, 24 Cal. App.2d 
92, 74 P.2d 536 (1937). The limitation statute which 
is applicable to an action for salary begins to run against 
each installment of salary as soon as it is due. Craw/ ord 
v. Hunt, 41 Ariz., 229, 17 P.2d 802 (1932). Hence, in 
the case at bar, the Plaintiff could not recover for back 
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wages for a period of more than three years prior to 
the commencement of this action. 
CONCLUSION 
The intent of the Utah Legislature was not to 
allow claims of discrimination every time a male and 
a female perform some of the same tasks, but was to 
provide for equal treatment of an employee by an 
employer. Unless the female is performing the same 
job there is no basis for discrimination. In the case 
before the bar, the plaintiff performed the same tasks 
as the men only on occasion and this does not constitute 
the same job, job classification or position to be filled 
or created. U nler the ~,ederal Act, it has been decided 
that even though men and women perform the same 
identical tasks 90% of the time this does not constitute 
the same job. In the case at hand the plaintiff did not 
perform the same tasks any where near this amount of 
time. 
The Legislature also intended that the Act apply 
only to jobs, job classifications and positions which were 
to be created or filled in the future so that discrimination 
might be eliminated over a period of time. Thus, the 
Act was not to have a retroactive effect. 
The plaintiff did not possess the qualifications 
which were possessed by the police officers and did not 
have the training, education or ability which the police 
officers had and which were required of them by the 
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defendant. One cannot claim equal pay unless he or 
she meets all qualifications required by an employer. 
Even in the event there was discrimination and the 
discrimination had as its sole basis sex, there are three 
reasons why this case is not one requiring back pay. 
( 1) The plaintiff was not underpaid for the job she 
performed, but the men with whom she was working 
were over-qualified in their assignment in the dispatch 
off ice. ( 2) The Commission could not grant back pay 
without up-grading the plaintiff, because the Act was 
not established for the purpose of fining or penalizing 
an offender, but for the purpose of eliminating dis-
crimination. The elimination of discrimination must 
be accomplished by an up-grading of the employee which 
in this case was not done. ( 3) An administrative agency 
cannot, because of the restrictions imposed by the Utah 
Constitution, perform a municipal function nor can 
it interfere with or supervise money or property of a 
municipality. 
In the event an award for back pay is granted, it 
should be the cliff erence between the salary paid plain-
tiff and that of a patrolman at the lowest Civil Service 
classification and not the difference between that paid 
the plaintiff and that of higher classified police officers 
working in the dispatch office. No person's salary should 
be allowed to fluctuate depending upon the longevity 
and promotions of another with whom they work. 
Lastly, there must be a period of limitation applied 
to any award for back pay and the period in this case 
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is three years as provided by the Utah statute. The 
statute of limitation operates as a bar against any in-
stallment due prior to three years from the filing of 
the complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. WALLACE EARL 
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